

REQUIREMENT FOR SERVICE SCHOOL TRAINING OF OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE NCO's

Captain Wayne A Snow
Roster Number 0160, Faculty Advisor Group 5, IOAC 1-69
November 1968

The United States Army Infantry School
Fort Benning, Georgia 31905
27 November 1968


IOAC 1-69

SUBJECT: Requirement for Service School Training of Operations and Intelligence NCO's

1. PROBLEM. To determine whether there is a requirement for formal service school training of Operations and Intelligence NCO's (MOS 11F40 and 11F50).
2. ASSUMPTIONS.
 - a. Only those individuals designated to fill a position calling for MOS 11F40 and MOS 11F50 in the operations or intelligence section of a tactical unit will be considered Operations and Intelligence NCO's.
 - b. There are insufficient vacancies existing for Operations or Intelligence NCO's at division, corps, or field army level to effect materially the determination of a requirement for formal service school training.
3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.
 - a. There is an army-wide shortage of personnel with MOS 11F. (2:2)
 - b. The conflict in the Republic of Vietnam has greatly increased the requirement for Operations and Intelligence NCO's to be well-qualified from the beginning of a tour of duty. (Annex C)
 - c. Three possible methods of training personnel for duties as Operations and Intelligence NCO's are on the job training (OJT), the use of correspondence courses, and attendance at a service school. (Annex D and E) (4:1-2)
4. DISCUSSION.
 - a. There is unanimous agreement by officers and NCO's questioned that a qualified Operations and Intelligence NCO is needed to fill each position for which authorized in brigade and battalion staffs. Since there is an army-wide shortage of personnel in MOS 11F20, 11F40, and 11F50, many of these positions are not filled by qualified personnel. The shortage of Operations and Intelligence NCO's on brigade and battalion staffs in the Republic of Vietnam is estimated to exceed fifty personnel. The authorized position most often lacking a qualified NCO is that of Assistant Operations Sergeant, E-7, at battalion level. (Annex A)
 - b. The lack of a qualified person to fill a position authorized an Operations and Intelligence NCO was keenly felt in Vietnam where it decreased the efficiency of the unit involved until the individual became proficient or was replaced by a qualified NCO. (Annex C)
 - c. The replies during personal interviews and to questionnaires

sent to students and faculty of the Infantry School with related experience in Vietnam indicate the following:

- (1.) It takes approximately three months to train an Operations and Intelligence NCO by OJT. (Annex D)
 - (2.) It is highly desirable for Operations and Intelligence NCO's to have combat experience prior to assumption of duties at battalion or brigade level in Vietnam. The experience thus gained is thought to improve markedly the judgment or "common sense" of the NCO's.
- d. Information obtained and opinions received indicate that the required number and quality of trained personnel could not feasibly be acquired by means of nonresident instruction. (Annex E)
- e. USCONARC has directed the establishment of the Infantry Operations and Intelligence Specialist Base Course at Fort Benning, thus indicating recognition of a requirement for service school training. (6:2)
- (1.) Eight hundred E-4's are projected to undergo this training during FY 69. (12:1)
 - (2.) This training has been designed to serve as an NCO candidate course. (4:1-2)
 - (3.) It appears that the course will produce school trained, but inexperienced junior E-5's to fill vacancies in an E-7 position in Vietnam.
- f. Ninety-five percent of the military personnel surveyed stated their opinion that there is a need for service school training of Operations and Intelligence NCO's.
5. CONCLUSIONS.
- a. There is no acceptable method of filling all positions for Operations and Intelligence NCO's in Vietnam with well-qualified personnel except through formal service school training.
 - b. At this time there is a requirement for formal service school training of Operations and Intelligence NCO's.
6. ACTION RECOMMENDED. Design a course of instruction so as to give preference in selection of students to NCO's in grades E-5, E-6, and E-7 who will be eligible for a second tour of duty in Vietnam upon completion of this course.


WAYNE A SNOW
Captain, Infantry

ANNEXES: A - Estimate of the Shortage of Qualified Operations and
Intelligence NCO's in Vietnam
B - Other Positions for MOS 11F
C - Disadvantages of Being Short a Qualified Operations
and Intelligence NCO
D - OJT
E - Correspondence Courses
F - Bibliography

CONCURRENCES: (Omitted)

NONCONCURRENCES: (Omitted)

CONSIDERATION OF NONCONCURRENCES: (Omitted)

ANNEXES ADDED: (Omitted)

FINAL ACTION RECOMMENDED: (Omitted)

ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY:

Date:

Approved (disapproved), including (excluding) exceptions.

Signature

ANNEX A. (Estimate of the Shortage of Qualified Operations and Intelligence NCO's in Vietnam)

A significant shortage of well-qualified Operations and Intelligence NCO's exists in Vietnam as explained below:

1. There are nineteen and two-thirds divisions in the US Army. Four are Armor Divisions. Of the remaining fifteen and two-thirds divisions, the equivalent of eight divisions are in Vietnam. Thus over one-half of the Infantry Brigades and Battalions are in Vietnam. Using the usual figure of three battalions per brigade and three brigades per division would indicate there are seventy-two battalions and twenty-four brigades in Vietnam. A more precise manner of determining the number of brigades and the number of Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, Airborne, and Airmobile Battalions in Vietnam would require reference to a classified source and the classification of the numbers used. (7:83) (9:20-21)
2. Currently there is approximately a twenty-four month interval between twelve month tours in Vietnam for personnel with MOS 11F40 in grade E-8 and eighteen months for personnel in grade E-7.
3. If there were no army-wide shortage in MOS 11F, the current assignment practice would place about thirty-five percent of the qualified personnel in an area containing over one-half of the positions. The result would be a shortage on the order of fifteen percent, without considering those personnel who become qualified as Operations and Intelligence NCO's while in Vietnam.
4. From DA Circular 611-4 dated 13 June 1968 we know there is a shortage world-wide in MOS 11F40 and 11F50. An assumed shortage of ten percent world-wide would increase the shortage in Vietnam to approximately nineteen percent. (2:2)
5. An Infantry Battalion has three positions for an Operations and Intelligence NCO. A brigade has five positions for an Operations and Intelligence NCO. Seventy-two battalions and twenty-four brigades would have a total of 336 positions. A shortage on the order of nineteen percent becomes a shortage within Vietnam of approximately sixty-four qualified personnel. (5:230) (11:9)
6. Seventy-five percent of those persons who responded to a questionnaire indicated that their battalions in Vietnam experienced a shortage of an Operations and Intelligence Sergeant. The shortage noted in brigade staff sections was negligible. A battalion short one NCO would fill the positions of Operations Sergeant and Intelligence Sergeant first, so the authorized position most often lacking a qualified NCO was that of Assistant Operations Sergeant, E-7.
7. Using the figure of seventy-five percent from paragraph 6 above, we find that seventy-five percent times seventy-two battalions indicates a shortage within Vietnam of approximately fifty-four qualified personnel.

8. Whether the figure sixty-four or fifty-four is accepted as more accurate, there is no doubt that a significant shortage of qualified Operations and Intelligence NCO's does exist in Vietnam.

ANNEX B. (Other Positions for MOS 11F)

1. Other positions with an MOS of 11F are listed below:

DUTY POSITION	MOS CODE	GRADE
a. Operations Assistant	11F20	E-4
b. Personnel Carrier Driver Scout Platoon	11F20	E-4
c. Platoon Sergeant Scout Platoon	11F40	E-7
d. Radar Operator	11F20	E-4
e. Senior Radar Operator	11F20	E-5
f. Team Leader Ground Survl Section	11F40	E-5
g. Section Sergeant Ground Survl Section	11F40	E-6
h. Squad Leader Scout Dog Platoon	11F40	E-6
i. Patrol Leader Inf Long Range Patrol Co	11F40	E-6
j. Platoon Sergeant Long Range Patrol Co or Scout Dog Platoon	11F40	E-7
k. Team Sergeant Replacment Team of Admin Service Co	11F40	E-7
l. Section Sergeant Replacment Section of Admin Service Co	11F50	E-8 (1:55) (5:240)

2. With the exception of the Operations Assistant, E-4, other positions which carry the MOS 11F have duties which do not bear much resemblance to those of the Operations and Intelligence NCO's. Consequently, there is little justification for developing a common course of instruction. For this reason any requirement for training personnel in these positions lends no weight to a decision concerning service school training of Operations and Intelligence NCO's.

ANNEX C (Disadvantages of Being Short a Qualified Operations and Intelligence NCO)

1. The replies during personal interviews and to questionnaires sent to students and faculty of the Infantry School with related experience in Vietnam confirm that the efficiency of the unit suffers if any of the authorized Operations and Intelligence NCO's are not well-qualified upon the assumption of their duties in Vietnam.
2. The following were cited as reasons for this observation:
 - a. Errors were caused by decisions based on lack of knowledge and experience.
 - b. Administrative mistakes were made requiring additional time and effort to be expended in their correction.
 - c. Reports were not always timely.
 - d. It did not allow the unit flexibility to establish a forward TOC.
 - e. Many extra hours were required to train an individual, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the officer or NCO who was doing the training.
 - f. Time available for planning operations was reduced in Vietnam, where so much depended on quick action based on timely intelligence. Consequently, the shortage of enough qualified NCO's to do the required work lead to certain omissions, such as the provision of an overlay to subordinate units.
 - g. Other people had to work longer hours to make up for the lack of one qualified NCO. Also, officers performed functions which could properly be handled by a competent NCO. For example, an officer rather than an NCO prepared the SITREP in some units.
 - h. In Vietnam, where a large portion of combat intelligence was collected at unit level, the lack of a qualified assistant Operations and Intelligence NCO impaired the fast analysis and processing of intelligence.
 - i. The lack of a qualified Assistant Operations Sergeant interfered with the smooth functioning of the TOC on a twenty-four hour a day basis and allowed for no depth in case of the sudden loss of either the Operations Sergeant or the Intelligence Sergeant.
 - j. The staff section had difficulty keeping track of the intelligence generated in other areas of operation. This requirement was important because battalions rotated among numerous areas of operation.
3. In the preceding paragraph I have explained the effects noted in units experiencing a shortage of trained Operations and Intelligence NCO's. As an additional reason why these NCO's needed to be well-qualified from the beginning of their tour

of duty in Vietnam, it should be pointed out that there was rarely an overlap of personnel in a position of sufficient length to allow an inexperienced incoming NCO to become qualified in the duties of an 11F40 prior to the departure of the NCO being replaced.

ANNEX D (OJT)

1. The following information was derived from responses to a questionnaire sent to students of IOAC 3-69 and to members of the staff and faculty of the Infantry School with experience in brigade or battalion level S2 and S3 sections. Additional information was gained by personal interview with selected officers and with Operations and Intelligence NCO's. The officers replying to the questionnaire and to interviews averaged ninety-five months of service and one tour of duty in Vietnam.
2. The advantages of OJT given were:
 - a. It was a successful method of developing the practical knowledge and skills needed to perform the duties involved. The superior performance of NCO's trained extensively, but only in this manner was noted by many officers.
 - b. It did not substantially interfere with performance of the staff sections in cases where there was sufficient overlap for break in of new personnel and where the sections did not habitually operate on a twenty-four hour basis.
 - c. In a peacetime environment, it was considered to be an inexpensive means of training.
 - d. The S2 or S3 was able to select a man for training by OJT whose performance and abilities had been observed in other capacities within the unit.
 - e. A certain amount of OJT was required upon arrival in a new unit staff section regardless of the type and amount of previous training. Even a well-trained and experienced NCO was not fully effective until he had learned the local SOP's and what to expect from the various people with whom he had to deal.
3. The disadvantages of OJT given were:
 - a. It required time to train personnel by OJT, during which time they were generally filling a vacancy. The estimates of the time required for this training varied from one to six months. Three months was the average estimate for ability to perform all the duties of that particular position in which trained, and five months was the average estimate to gain a broader knowledge required for success in other positions within an S2 or S3 section. In general, the estimates given by NCO's were longer than those given by officers.
 - b. In a few cases time was wasted attempting to give OJT to individuals who were subsequently found to be unsuited for the position.
 - c. It did not provide training in all aspects of the duties which might be encountered in future assignments. For example, some battalions did not produce a single written operation order within a one year period. It was also noted that an NCO trained as an Assistant Operations

Sergeant by OJT required additional training to perform fully the duties of an Intelligence NCO.

- d. In a combat situation, the cost of training an individual by OJT was considered to be high in terms of reduced staff section and unit effectiveness as explained in Annex C.

ANNEX E (Correspondence Courses)

1. Correspondence courses noted which are designed to improve knowledge and effectiveness of Operations and Intelligence NCO's are:
 - a. Subcourses Applicable to MOS 11F, Department of Nonresident Instruction, USAIS, Fort Benning, Ga. (3:49)
 - b. Infantry Senior Noncommissioned Officer Course, Department of Nonresident Instruction, USAIS, Fort Benning, Ga. (3:18-19)
 - c. Special Extension Course - Sergeant Major and Operations Sergeant, Nonresident Instruction Program, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (8:13)
2. By checking the files in the Department of Nonresident Instruction, USAIS, it was discovered that very few active duty personnel enroll in Subcourses Applicable to MOS 11F. More than 90% of the personnel who take this instruction are in US Army Reserve or National Guard units. Furthermore, this instruction is not designed to qualify personnel in the MOS, but to supplement their knowledge gained by OJT.
3. The scope of the Infantry Senior Noncommissioned Officer Course is "To prepare the student for infantry battalion, brigade, and higher level staff duty primarily in the operations field, and for enrollment in the USACGSC sergeant major and operations sergeant extension course." (3:18) A tabulation of the figures available indicate an enrollment averaging forty per month during 1968. Course completion has amounted only to twenty personnel from January 1968 through November 1968. It was noted that this figure should expand because the course was just started in 1967. This course is available to enlisted personnel in grades E6 and above.
4. Correspondence courses have the following advantages:
 - a. They are inexpensive.
 - b. Personnel work on them during non-duty hours, so they do not interfere with performance on the job.
 - c. They are available regardless of the location of the individual.
5. The disadvantages of correspondence courses pointed out to me by those who had taken them were:
 - a. They did not require the degree of attention and effort expended by OJT or attendance at a service school.
 - b. They usually were not as comprehensive as a corresponding service school.
 - c. There existed a tendency to scan material solely to find the answer required by the course rather than to study material for thorough understanding.

- d. The voluntary nature of enrolling in a correspondence course lead to relatively smaller numbers of persons taking a particular course than might be desired to fulfill the needs of the service.
 - e. By lack of interest or initiative many persons failed to complete a course in which they were enrolled.
 - f. In cases where enrollment in a course was required, dishonest students could copy answers from others, thus failing to achieve the desired degree of learning.
 - g. Students were not encouraged by the procedures inherent in correspondence courses to ask questions concerning points within the instruction about which they were not clear. A check at the Department of Nonresident Instruction, USAIS, revealed that nearly every question asked concerned administration of the courses rather than dealing with the subject matter presented.
6. One NCO who had completed the Infantry Senior Noncommissioned Officer Course expressed the opinion that this course did not achieve the objectives quoted in paragraph 3 above.
7. My conclusion with regard to correspondence courses is that they may be used to supplement OJT or service school training, but would not suffice by themselves to qualify an individual as an Operations and Intelligence NCO.

ANNEX F (Bibliography)

1. AR 611-201, Personnel Selection and Classification, Enlisted Military Occupational Specialties. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, January 1967. Change 6, 27 March 1968, 53-55.
2. DA Circular 611-4. MOS Shortages. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 13 June 1968.
3. Extension Course Catalog. Fort Benning, Ga.: USAIS, 1 July 1967.
4. Fact Sheet, "Infantry Operations and Intelligence Specialist Skill Development Base." Fort Benning, Ga.: BBOD, USAIS, 9 August 1968.
5. Infantry Reference Data. Fort Benning, Ga.: USAIS, July 1968.
6. Message Cite 62053, "Implementation of Skill Development Base Training." Fort Monroe, Va.: USCONARC, 25 July 1968.
7. Mildrew, Frank T. "From Mekong to DMZ: A Fighting Year for the U.S. Army's Best." Army. November 1968, 82-95.
8. Nonresident Instruction Program. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: USACGSC, April 1967.
9. "Outlook for Army Programs in 1969." Army. March 1968, 20-21.
10. Program of Instruction for 250-11F40-1, Infantry Operations and Intelligence Specialist Skill Development Base Course. Fort Benning, Ga.: USAIS, November 1967.
11. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 7-42G, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Infantry Division Brigade. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 31 March 1966.
12. "US Army Service School and ATC Class Schedule for FY 69, Infantry Operations and Intelligence NCO Candidate Course." Fort Benning, Ga.: USAIS, 21 August 1968.